I have been spending a fair amount of time over the last few months, talking and listening to board members and advisors, including industry experts, about cyber risk.
A number of things are clear:
- Boards, not just those members who are on the audit and/or risk committee, are concerned about cyber and the risk it represents to their organization. They are concerned because they don’t understand it – and the actions they should take as directors. The level of concern is sufficient for them to attend conferences dedicated to the topic rather than relying on their organization.
- They are not comfortable with the information they are receiving on cyber risk from management – management’s assessment of the risk that it represents to their organization; the measures management has taken to (a) prevent intrusions, (b) detect intrusions that got past defenses, and (c) respond to such intrusions; how cyber risk is or may be affected by changes in the business, including new business initiatives; and, the current level and trend of intrusion attacks (some form of metrics).
- The risk should be assessed, evaluated, and addressed, not in isolation as a separate IT or cyber risk, but in terms of its potential effect on the business. Cyber risk should be integrated into enterprise risk management. Not only does it need to be assessed in terms of its potential effect on organizational business objectives, but it is only one of several risks that may affect each business objective.
- It is impossible to eliminate cyber risk. In fact, it is broadly recognized that it is impossible to have impenetrable defenses (although every reasonable effort should be made to harden them). That mandates increased attention to the timely detection of those who have breached the defenses, as well as the capability to respond at speed.
- Because it is impossible to eliminate risk, a decision has to be made (by the board and management, with advice and counsel from IT, information security, the risk officer, and internal audit) as to the level of risk that is acceptable. How much will the organization invest in cyber compared to the level of risk and the need for those same resources to be invested in other initiatives? The board members did not like to hear talk of accepting a level of risk, but that is an uncomfortable fact of life – they need to get over and deal with it!
The National Association of Corporate Directors has published a handbook on cyber for directors (free after registration).
Here is a list of questions I believe directors should consider. They should be asked of executive management (not just the CIO or CISO) in a session dedicated to cyber.
- How do you identify and assess cyber-related risks?
- Is your assessment of cyber-related risks integrated with your enterprise-wide risk management program so you can include all the potential effects on the business (including business disruption, reputation risk, inability to bill customers, loss of IP, compliance risk, and so on) and not just “IT-risk”?
- How do you evaluate the risk to know whether it is too high?
- How do you decide what actions to take and how much resource to allocate?
- How often do you update your cyber risk assessment? Do you have sufficient insight into changes in cyber-related risks?
- How do you assess the potential new risks introduced by new technology? How do you determine when to take the risk because of the business value?
- Are you satisfied that you have an appropriate level of protection in place to minimize the risk of a successful attack?
- How will you know when your defenses have been breached? Will you know fast enough to minimize any loss or damage?
- Can you respond appropriately at speed?
- What procedures are in place to notify you, and then the board, in the event of a breach?
- Who has responsibility for cybersecurity and do they have the access they need to senior management?
- Is there an appropriate risk-aware culture within the organization, especially given the potential for any manager to introduce new risks by signing up for new cloud services?
I welcome your thoughts, perspectives, and comments.
COSO’s ERM Framework defines risk appetite in a way that many have adopted:
“Risk appetite is the amount of risk, on a broad level, an organization is willing to accept in pursuit of value. Each organization pursues various objectives to add value and should broadly understand the risk it is willing to undertake in doing so.”
The problem I want to discuss is whether there is such a thing as an “amount of risk”.
The traditional way of assessing a risk is to establish values for its potential impact (or consequences) and their likelihood. The assessment might also include qualitative attributes of the risk, such as the speed of impact and so on.
But, for many risks there is more than one possible impact, with varying levels of likelihood.
Take the example of an organization that wants to expand and sell its products in a new country. It has set a sales target of 10,000 units in the first year, but recognizes not only that the target may not be reached but that, if things work well, it might be exceeded.
If the sales target is not reached, the initiative will result in a loss of as much as 500 units of currency. The likelihood of that loss is estimated at 5% and is considered unacceptable. There is also a 10% likelihood of a 250 loss, also unacceptable.
Management decides to treat the risk through a number of actions, including advertising and the use of in-country agents, which should reduce the likelihood and extent of losses. However, the cost of these actions will reduce the profits achieved when sales reach or exceed target.
The chart below shows the distribution of possible P&L results, both before and after treating the risk.
So there is no single “amount of risk”. There are many possible outcomes.
It is not sufficient to place a value on the distribution of all possible outcomes and compare that to some other value established as the acceptable level – because some of the points may individually be unacceptable and require treatment.
In this example, management has decided that the likelihood of the greatest levels of loss is unacceptable. If they had reduced the array of possibilities to a calculated number (perhaps based on the area under the curve), they probably would not have considered whether each possibility was acceptable and would not have taken the appropriate action.
Knowing whether the possibilities are acceptable or not, and making appropriate actions to treat them, is critical. A single “amount of risk” fails that test.
We could take this discussion a lot further, but I will stop here. What do you think?
With help from Grant Purdy, IFAC has published an excellent Thought Paper on risk management. From Bolt-on to Built-in: Managing Risk as an Integral Part of Managing an Organization.
This is one of the most important papers on risk management in recent years – not because it says something new, but because it (a) comes from this well-respected, global organization, (b) is contrary not only to many current practices but also to how guidance from several regulators is being interpreted, and (c) is expressed forcefully and eloquently.
The IFAC paper has a wealth of good advice. I can only excerpt portions because if I quoted everything of note, I would end up copying most of the document!
I encourage everybody to download and read the paper for themselves.
The theme is captured in this:
In some organizations the approach to management of risk and internal control has deviated from its original purpose: to support decision making and reduce uncertainty associated with achieving objectives. Instead, risk management in these organizations has become an objective in itself, for example, through the institution of a nonintegrated, stand-alone risk management function. This typically removes responsibility for the management of risk from where it primarily belongs: incorporated into line management. A separate risk management function, even though established with the best intentions, may hamper rather than facilitate good decision making and subsequent execution. Managing risk in an organization is everyone’s responsibility.
The paragraph makes some essential points:
- Risk management (and the part of risk management that is internal control, as controls only exist to provide reasonable assurance that risk is at acceptable levels) is all about enabling informed, intelligent decisions
- The overall purpose is to set and then achieve the right objectives
- A separate risk management function often separates the consideration of risk from the running of the business – degrading rather than enhancing decision-making and organizational performance
IFAC continues the theme:
This Paper contends it is time to recognize that managing risk and establishing effective control form natural parts of an organization’s system of management that is primarily concerned with setting and achieving its objectives. Effective risk management and internal control, if properly implemented as an integral part of managing an organization, is cost effective and requires less effort than dealing with the consequences of a detrimental event. It also generates value from the benefits gained through identified and realized opportunities.
Risk management should not be separate from management processes. It is more than embedding the consideration of risk into management processes. It is an integral part of decision-making and running the enterprise.
This is stressed:
Risk management should never be implemented in isolation; it should always be fully integrated into the organization’s overall system of management. This system should include the organization’s processes for good governance, including those for strategy and planning, making decisions in operations, monitoring, reporting, and establishing accountability.
Note that risk management helps organizations select objectives and related strategies as well as enable optimal performance and achievement of the objectives. Risk management does not start after objectives are established, but before. “Setting objectives itself can be one of the greatest sources of risk.” IFAC explains that:
Risk management assists organizations in making informed decisions about:
- objectives they want to achieve;
- the level, nature, and amount of risk that they want to assume in pursuit of those objectives; and
- the controls required to support achieving their objectives.
IFAC emphasizes that the management of risk is not for its own sake. It is to enable the achievement of the right objectives.
The main objective of an organization is not to have effective controls, nor to effectively manage risk, but to properly set and achieve its goals; to be in compliance and capable of managing surprises and disruptions along the way; and to create sustainable value. The management of risk in pursuit of these objectives should be an inseparable and integral part of all these activities.
In IFAC’s discussion of maturity, they say something that sounds very similar indeed to OCEG’s definition of GRC: “Effective risk management supports management’s attempts to make all parts of an organization more cohesive, integrated, and aligned with its objectives, while operating more effectively, efficiently, ethically, and legally.” (They continue with a very high-level example of a four-stage maturity model.)
I like how they say that the owner of the enterprise objective (responsible for performance against it) should also be the owner of related risks, not any risk officer:
As an organization’s risk is inextricably connected to its objectives, the responsibility for managing risk cannot lie with anyone other than the person who is responsible for setting and achieving those objectives.
Line management needs to accept its responsibility and not delegate risk management and internal control to specialized staff departments. Placing responsibility within the line also implies that staff or support functions should not, or no longer, be the “owner” of risk management in organizations. However, these support functions nevertheless play a crucial role in supporting line management in the effective management of risk.
There is a critical discussion of risk management flaws, with not only a list of the most serious but a table that compares good and bad practices. Some of the flaws they identify as serious are:
- “Having a compliance-only mentality ….. ignoring the need to address both the compliance and performance aspects of risk management.”
- “Treating risk as only negative and overlooking the idea that organizations need to take risks in pursuit of their objectives. Effective risk management enables an organization to exploit opportunities and take on additional risk while staying in control and, thereby, creating and preserving value.”
Some of you know that I am writing a book about world-class risk management. When it comes to risk reporting, I found the topic tough to write about because so many risk reports (and risk registers) are just a list of risks and their risk ‘levels’. They are not focused on how each of the enterprise’s objectives is affected. I will include this section as a quote because it gets it right and says it well:
As risk is the effect of uncertainty on achieving objectives, it would be inadvisable to manage risk without taking into account the effect on objectives. Unfortunately, in some organizations the linkage between the risks periodically reported to the board and the strategic objectives that are most critical to the long-term success of the company is at best opaque and at worst, missing completely. As a consequence, risk is insufficiently understood or controlled, even though the organization devotes some attention and resources to the management of risk. Risk management without taking into account the effects on objectives is thus ineffective.
Let me close this post with a quote from Unilever that is included in the IFAC document:
“At Unilever, we believe that effective risk management is fundamental to good business management and that our success as an organization depends on our ability to identify and then exploit the key risks and opportunities for the business. Successful businesses take/manage risks and opportunities in a considered, structured, controlled, and effective way. Our risk management approach is embedded in the normal course of business. It is ‘paper light—responsibility high.’ Risk management is now part of everyone’s job, every day! It is no longer managed as a separate standalone activity that is ‘delegated to others.”
What do you think? I welcome your comments.
By the way, I hope those involved in the COSO ERM update, as well as those working on an update of the ISO 31000:2009 global risk management standard, pay attention. IFAC has proved that accountants can publish excellent guidance on risk management!
Protiviti has shared with us a useful Top 10 Lessons Learned from Implementing COSO 2013.
I especially like this section:
It is presumed that everyone understands that a top-down, risk-based approach remains applicable to Section 404 compliance, and the transition to the 2013 updated Framework does not affect this. While we don’t list this as a lesson, we could have, because some companies either forgot or neglected to apply this approach when setting the scope and objectives for using the Framework. As a result, they went overboard with their controls documentation and testing. We can’t stress enough that the COSO 2013 Framework did not change the essence of, and the need for, a top-down, risk-based approach in complying with SOX Section 404.
The report has a number of excellent pieces of advice. However, I wouldn’t be me if I didn’t have points of disagreement.
The first is on mapping. It is NOT necessary to map all your controls to the principles. If we take principle 10, for example, it states “The organization selects and develops control activities that contribute to the mitigation of risks to the achievement of objectives to acceptable levels”. Rather than map all your control activities to this principle (or to principle 11, which is the same – just for IT general controls), the organization needs to identify the control(s) it relies on for its assessment that the principles are present and functioning. For principles 10 and 11, that will be the SOX scoping exercise. For the principle on fraud, the control that should be identified is the fraud risk assessment, not every control relied on to detect or prevent fraud.
Then there is the assertion that indirect controls are the same as entity-level controls. COSO (both 1992 and 2013) tell us, correctly, that activities in each of its components may operate at any level within the organization. For example, let’s say that an account analysis is prepared by Corporate Finance as part of the period-end close. This entity-level control may operate with sufficient precision to be relied upon to detect a material error or omission in that account. But the entity-level control is a direct control, not an indirect control. (A direct control can be relied upon to prevent or detect an error. An indirect control is one that serves to increase or decrease the likelihood that other, direct, controls will function effectively. Hiring, integrity, oversight by the board – these are indirect controls where a defect would increase the likelihood that affected direct controls would fail.)
Another example that helps us understand the difference is the hiring process (related to principle 4, in the Control Environment). The hiring process most often is at a lower level than the entity-level, often as deep as the activity level as that is where most hiring managers reside. Controls in the hiring process in this situation are activity level (or what I call ‘intermediate level’ controls, operating at a location or business unit rather than either the top or the bottom of the organization) and are indirect controls.
I could quibble with one or two more points, but I don’t want to detract from the report. I want, instead, to encourage you to read and discuss it.
What do you think?
What additional lessons have you learned?
 Full credit for this wording goes to the E&Y national office, who used it in a conversation I had with them about the firm’s training of its audit staff.
In my opinion, one sentence stands out, whether you are looking at the COSO Internal Control – Integrated Framework (2013 version) or the COSO Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework.
That sentence is:
An effective system of internal control reduces, to an acceptable level, the risk of not achieving an objective relating to one, two, or all three categories.
The sentence is important because it emphasizes the fact that the purpose of controls is to address risk, and that you have ‘enough’ control when risk is at desired levels.
To me, this means that:
- Before you assess the effectiveness of internal control, you need to know your objective(s), because we are talking about risk to objectives – not risk out of context
- You need to know the risk to those objectives
- You need to know what is an acceptable level of risk for each objective, and
- You need to be able to assess whether the controls provide reasonable assurance that risk is at acceptable levels
You may ask “where is that sentence?”, because when consultants (and even COSO and IIA) make presentations on COSO 2013 and effective internal control, all you hear about are the principles and components.
In fact, anybody who reads COSO 2013 should have no difficulty finding this most important sentence. It’s in the section headed “Requirements for Effective Internal Control”.
This is how that section starts:
An effective system of internal control provides reasonable assurance regarding achievement of an entity’s objectives. Because internal control is relevant both to the entity and its subunits, an effective system of internal control may relate to a specific part of the organizational structure. An effective system of internal control reduces, to an acceptable level, the risk of not achieving an objective relating to one, two, or all three categories. It requires that:
- Each of the five components of internal control and relevant principles are present and functioning
- The five components are operating together in an integrated manner
There is no mention of satisfying the requirement that the “components and relevant principles are present and functioning” until after the reference to risk being at acceptable levels.
In fact, I believe – and I know of at least one prominent COSO leader agrees – that assessing the presence and functioning of the components and principles is secondary, provided to help with the assessment.
Let’s have a look at the very next paragraph in the section:
When a major deficiency exists with respect to the presence and functioning of a component or relevant principle or in terms of the components operating together, the organization cannot conclude that it has met the requirements for an effective system of internal control.
When you look at this with the (COSO) risk lens, this translates to the ability to assess internal control as effective, and the principles and components as present and functioning, as long as there is no deficiency in internal control that is rated as “major”.
How does COSO determine whether a deficiency is “major”? That can be found in the section, “Deficiencies in Internal Control”.
An internal control deficiency or combination of deficiencies that is severe enough to adversely affect the likelihood that the entity can achieve its objectives is referred to as a “major deficiency”.
Let’s translate this as well:
- If the likelihood of achieving objective(s) is “severe”, then the risk is outside acceptable levels.
- If the risk is outside acceptable levels, not only should the related component(s) or principle(s) not be assessed as present and functioning, but internal control is not considered effective.
- When it comes to SOX compliance, a “major deficiency” translates to a “material weakness”. The objective for SOX is to file financial statements with the SEC that are free of material error or omission. The acceptable level of risk is where the likelihood of a material error or omission is less than reasonably possible.
- That means that if the deficiency is less than “major” (or “material” for SOX purposes), then the related component(s) or principle(s) can be assessed as present and functioning – and internal control can be assessed as effective.
So, the only way to assess whether the principles and components are present and functioning is to determine whether the risk to objectives (after considering any related control deficiency) is at acceptable levels.
Do you see what I mean?
Risk is at the core. Assessing the presence and functioning of components or principles without first understanding what is an acceptable level of risk to objectives is misunderstanding COSO!
Why are so many blind to this most important sentence?
I have a theory: the presentations were all prepared based on the Exposure Draft. That document failed to reference the requirement that internal control be designed to bring risk within acceptable levels. (The defect was fixed after comments were received on the issue.)
Do you have a better theory?
Can you explain the blindness of so many to the most important sentence in the entire Framework?
A new article in Singapore’s Business Times explains that when Singapore achieved its independence in 1965 (through separation from Malaysia), its attention to enterprise risk management helped it become the economic success it is today. The author says:
Mr Lee [Singapore’s Prime Minister] could arguably have contributed to the development of the ERM framework. Part I of From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000 reads in many areas like a primer on ERM concepts and techniques.
The article refers to the 1995 Australia/New Zealand risk management guidance, which was followed by the COSO (seen as an American publication) and ISO publications.
I like the article’s definition:
ERM can be broadly defined as managing uncertainty – both the risk and opportunity arising therefrom – to create, sustain and grow value.
In 1965, Singapore was faced by a number of grim realities. It had no natural resources; in fact, it has to import almost all its water and food. (The article talks about the lack of an ‘economic hinterland’.)At that time, Singapore had uncertain relations from its neighbors in Malaysia and Indonesia, which could have led to conflict. In its early days of independence from Great Britain (achieved in 1959), the region went through a period of communist insurgency, so civil peace could not be taken for granted. Finally, the region had a culture that included a level of corruption and bribery (coyly referred to in the article as ‘guanxi’).
Singapore’s ERM program identified three risks, according to the article:
Risk A was survival without an economic hinterland. Risk B centred on guanxi or personal relationships in business transactions. Risk C was the prevalent toleration of money politics accepted as common practice and part of the regional political culture.
Risk A arose from the uncertainty of the new nation’s survival without an economic hinterland following Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia.
Risk B and Risk C, attributable to history and culture, threatened achievement of the strategic goals and operational objectives arising from Risk A.
The leadership team saw both Risk A and Risk B as road blocks. These risks precluded good corporate governance essential to attract foreign direct investments to support Singapore Inc’s early industrialisation goals.
Singapore’s leadership team addressed these three risks, not by always trying to limit risk but in some cases working to take advantage of opportunities.
To mitigate Risk A, the leadership team identified the opportunities presented by the uncertainty of survival without an economic hinterland.
These opportunities were channelled to business planning. A plan and strategy re-emerged, Mr Lee wrote, to “leapfrog the region”, link up with developed nations, and “create a First-World oasis in a Third-World region”.
The key operational objective was to build Singapore Inc’s own economic hinterland, bring about transformational change and prove the prognosticators wrong.
Responding to Risk B and Risk C to achieve comparative advantage in a region known for corruption, the leadership team embraced the rule of law.
Built on the legacy British legal system, the law was implemented under a culture of efficient, effective and honest enforcement.
This served to encourage the inflow of investments and to protect investors. The action comported with the ERM concept and technique to use controls, together with monitoring, as a risk response or risk treatment.
Control was in the form of laws, regulations and rules to mitigate the identified cultural risks. Monitoring came from the enforcement of rules efficiently, effectively and honestly.
This is a time when tributes to Lee Kuan Yew (the Mr. Lee referred to by the article) are flowing in. Who can dispute the success of his leadership (while recognizing the harshness of some earlier actions)?
Is it justifiable to put much of the transformation of Singapore down to risk management? The article says:
The legacy of Mr Lee and his pioneer generation of leaders in facing uncertainty with capacity, sagacity and gumption is an inspiration to managers in this endeavor.
What do you think?
Is risk management about “facing uncertainty with capacity, sagacity and gumption”?
I would like to say that the answer is “yes”, because I used to work for PwC and know many of their people – very good people.
I would also like to say “yes” because COSO has hired PwC to lead the update of their Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework.
But, I cannot say that they do – at least not what is required for the fully effective management of uncertainty.
I think they understand much of the common, traditional wisdom about risk management, that managing risk is about avoiding threats as you strive to achieve your objectives.
But, I think they fail to understand that uncertainty between where you are and where you want to go contains both threats and opportunities – and managing risk is about making intelligent decisions at all levels of the organization, both to limit the effect and likelihood of bad things happening and to increase the effect and likelihood of good things.
Risk management is more than a risk appetite framework set by executives and approved by the board.
It is more than “embedding” the consideration of risk into the strategy-setting and execution processes.
It is more than enabling the board and executive management to make informed decisions, or even for division leaders to make informed decisions. Every decision, whether by executives or junior employees, creates and/or modifies risk.
No. Effective risk management is something that is (or should be) an integral part of making decisions and running the business every minute of every day, at all levels across not just the enterprise but the extended enterprise.
It’s about enabling decision-makers to take the right amount of the right risk.
What’s the point of a risk appetite statement if it is not effective in driving decisions, which occur not only in the board and executive committee rooms, but in every corner and crevice of the organization?
I am using PwC’s latest publication as the basis for this opinion. While Risk in review: Decoding uncertainty, delivering value (subtitled How leading companies use risk management to drive strategic, operational, and financial performance) makes some good points, it also misses the key point about enabling decision-makers to take the right amount of the right risk. It focuses instead on a view of risk management that is centered on a periodic review of a limited, point-in-time list of negative risks – such as those found in a heat map.
(The good point made by PwC is that risk and strategy need to be entwined, both in the setting of strategy and its execution. It is also useful to see that few organizations, just 12% in their view, have achieved PwC’s limited view of risk management leadership.)
I will let you read PwC’s ideas and limit my comments to their Five steps to risk management program leadership.
1. Create a risk appetite framework, and take an aggregated view of risk
I have no problem with the principle that the board and top management should understand and provide guidance to decision-makers so that they take the right amount of the right risk. I also agree that there are multiple sources of risk to any business objective, and that it is necessary to see the full picture of how uncertainty might affect the achievement of each objective.
But, as I said, a risk appetite framework has little value if it is not sufficiently granular so that every decision-maker knows what he or she must do if they are to take the right amount of the right risk. Few organizations have been able to translate a risk appetite statement to actionable guidance for decision-makers, even when they try to use risk tolerance statements. Risk criteria at the decision-maker level must be established that are consistent with the aggregated enterprise view, and this is exceptionally difficult in practice.
In addition, decision-makers should not be excessively inhibited from seizing opportunities or taking/ retaining “negative risk” when it is justified. The focus is far too often on limiting risk, even when it is at a level that should be taken.
2. Monitor key business risks through dashboards and a common GRC technology platform
I agree that every decision-maker should know the current level of risk. But what is key is that the decision-makers have this information. While it is nice to have the risk function aware of current levels of risk, it is the decision-makers who have to act with that knowledge.
Further, why this nonsense about a “GRC technology platform”? Let’s talk about a risk management solution. I know that PwC makes a lot of money helping organizations select and then implement GRC solutions, but we are talking about risk management. Let’s focus on the technology needed for the effective management of risk by decision-makers at all levels across the organization. Integrating internal audit and policy management is far less important (IMHO).
Finally, people forget (and that includes PwC) that you need to monitor risk to each objective, not risk in isolation. Executives and managers need to receive integrated performance and risk information for each of their objectives.
3. Build a program around expanding and emerging business risk, such as third-party risk and the digital frontier
Everybody talks about risk expanding, that there is more risk today than in the past. I am not sure that is correct. Maybe we are just more attuned (which is a good thing) to thinking about risk, and certainly risk sources are becoming more complex. But is there actually more risk?
PwC talks about third-party risk, but that is not new at all. I wish they would talk about risk across the extended enterprise, which would broaden the picture some.
Technology-related business risk clearly merits everybody’s attention. It is unfortunate that insufficient resources are being applied by the majority of organizations to understanding and addressing both the potential harms and benefits of new technology.
4. Continuously strengthen your second and third lines of defense
Is there a reason we shouldn’t strengthen management’s ability to address uncertainty? (They are the so-called first line of defense.) Instead of the risk function feeding fish to management, why not train them to catch their own fish? Every decision-maker should be trained in disciplined decision-making, including the disciplined consideration of uncertainty.
Yes, the second line (risk management, compliance, information security, and so on) should be strengthened.
But, internal audit should not be limited to being seen as a “line of defense”. For a start, risk is not always something you need to defend against – often it should be actively sought as a source of value. Then, internal audit should help the organization actively take the right amount of the right risk, which it does by providing assurance that the processes for doing so are effective and by making suggestions for improvement.
I much prefer to talk about lines of offense. When you attack, you still need to be aware of IEDs, sniper positions, and mines. But the focus is on achieving success rather than avoiding failure.
5. Partner with a risk management provider to close the gap on internal competencies
Such a self-serving platitude! Yes, fill resource gaps with competent, knowledgeable professionals. But don’t hire a consultant to run periodic workshops – fill that need in-house.
Am I unfair to PwC?
Do they understand risk management and what it needs to be if an organization is to make the most of uncertainty?
We need to be tough on them if they are going to help COSO bring their ERM Framework up to the standard required for today and tomorrow – enabling better decisions so everyone takes the right level of the right risk.
I welcome your thoughts.